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This paper presents case study evidence of a rare attempt to make the corporate
human resource function strategic. More significantly, the paper’s theoretical
approach and the research questions it addresses examine the material beyond
the confines of HRM discourse that emphasizes “strategic choice”, integration or
fit as received management strategies. Alternatively, the empirical, yet theoretically
informed research questions suggest that strategic HRM necessarily de-skills the
autonomy and discretion of many workers. Further, to be effective HRM must
be diluted to reflect what is often (un)spoken budget and financial performance
criteria that constitute an internal audit system. The theoretical arguments and
empirical material presented in this paper appears relevant to a critically informed
accountancy audience for two reasons. First, the case demonstrates how the
language of financial management is diffused within other management fields such
as HRM. Second, although the centralized system of performance management for
project management appeared as a human resource innovation it intensified the
significance of financial constraints on human resource staff whose labour process
was previously relatively autonomous.
c© 2001 Academic Press
Introduction
This paper examines the limitations of strategic human resource management as a
management control strategy in engineering process plant contracting (EPPC). The
paper reports on a case study of a leading project management firm in EPPC, an
internationalized industry that is largely unresearched by human resource manage-
ment specialists. The study examines how one such firm “Exbeck”1 has responded
to external competitive pressures through a process of internal re-structuring.
Exbeck made its corporate human resource function a “Full Business Partner” in
project management a move that aimed to realize the strategic potential of the
function. In this capacity the corporate human resource function assumed control
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of management development and more controversially took up a role in monitoring
corporate and divisional performance in project pre-planning and operations.
The relocation of the corporate human resource function, ostensibly to extend its
power base and surveillance activity, improve corporate monitoring and employee
performance appears at first sight to be an “ideal type” application of strategic
HRM. However, a process of “reverse delegation” by key employees frustrated this
attempt. The paper details the interplay between corporate control strategies and
effective resistance by project managers and describes a corporate human resource
function in a paradoxical, tension ridden and inconsistent position—with a corporate
power base effectively undermined by project management “kingpins”.
The paper divides into four parts. First, an industry informed discussion
highlights contemporary competitive conditions, the corporate role of Exbeck’s
human resource function in cost control and financial performance—in particular
its promotion to full business partner in project management. The purpose in so
presenting this material is to provide a contrast with what might be termed an
alternative and more radical interpretation of the case material in parts two and
three. Second, the paper suggests that strategic HRM in the large corporation
necessarily de-skills the autonomy and independence of many workers. Equally,
for “bottom line” success strategic HRM is necessarily diluted from the tradition
of its human relations origins highlighted in the prescriptive literature (see Beer
et al., 1984; Walton & Lawrence, 1985). In contrast to this, budgetary and
financial performance measures constitute an internal audit system rather than a
concentration on the quality of working life and improved mechanisms for employee
involvement. Here the paper follows approaches developed by Hopper et al. (1986,
1987) and Hopper and Armstrong (1991). Hopper et al. (1986) demonstrates
the central role of accounting and financial controls in the creation of surplus
value. More significantly than this, their material illustrates the pervasive impact
of financial controls in other management functions. As the Exbeck case illustrates
the centrality of impersonal and apparently neutral financial logic obscures what
is direct discipline in the labour process. The historical significance of accounting
and financial controls within the development of the capitalist labour process is
further detailed by Hopper et al. (1987). By contrast Hopper and Armstrong (1991)
build on this by examining the history of labour controls in North American firms.
They conclude that the aim of increasingly sophisticated accounting controls was
the destruction of craft labour and its control of the labour process at the point
of production and its replacement with centralized standard cost driven scientific
management. Both aims are evident in this case study. The third part of the paper
examines financially inspired HRM within wider debates on the labour process and
the success or otherwise of de-skilling strategies. Lastly, the paper concludes by
discussing the implications of its arguments and findings.
The paper contributes to practitioner and academic knowledge by addressing
two research questions. First, the de-centralisation of HRM to line management.
Exbeck’s strategy is particularly interesting because contrary to popular images
of HRM it aimed to remove unilateral control from line managers and centralize
executive control of human resources. This positioned the corporate function in a
“producer” role in project management. Second, de-skilling in management control
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strategies. The findings from this study suggest that management control strategies
such as strategic HRM can improve financial performance without sustainable
reform in the labour process of employees. This is the case because functional
strategies and the discourse that surround them explain and legitimize the take-up
and utility of particular strategies in terms of the problems they solve, but exclude
any consideration of the problems they create or fail to address. (see Salaman,
1982; Armstrong, 1987; Hopper & Armstrong, 1991; Legge, 1995 for discussion of
this issue.)
Research methods
The fieldwork was conducted over a 5 year period between 1990–1995 with
repeat interviews and participation in and observation of emergent organizational
responses such as the “Human Resources Agent for Change Programme”. All
the human resource function’s internal documentation was made available, as
was a copy of a commissioned consultant’s report. Further, the results of an
employee attitude survey conducted by the human resource function was made
available. The survey aimed to measures employee attitudes towards commitment
and loyalty to the company and allowed employees to list reasons why either
was impaired. Employees completed a questionnaire and if they wished to do so
made themselves available for interview. In the course of this research project
some employees were re-interviewed. Financial data was available from published
company accounts whereas project logs and tender documents proved to be of
greater use. Twenty-five interviews were conducted, the majority in person but some
over the phone or video conferences. Formal interviews were held with the corporate
head of human resources (five meetings) and the HR policy leaders in each section
(one meeting each). On average each meeting was of a 1 hour duration. Clerical and
administrative staff were also interviewed. Over the course of the project follow-up
meetings were held after significant organizational innovations such as the project
task force system (PTF). These became less formal when they were held “on site”.
All interviews were taped and transcribed. As the fieldwork progressed strategy and
focus group meetings were attended each of which was chaired by the “Executive
Sponsor” of human resources. Lastly, appraisal and employee ranking meetings for
project managers were attended if the subject had no objection.
1. The Case Study
The competitive framework in engineering process plant contracting
The Exbeck board recognized that although the firm was able to consistently win
project tenders it was experiencing growing operational difficulties in completing
projects to or near to budget. The importance of this problem was compounded
by sector specific developments (for further details see Clark, 1998) that have
significantly reduced project mark-ups for contractors. In combination these
developments had the effect of reducing Exbeck’s profitability and cash flow.
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An internal business review concluded that a significant factor in diagnosing
Exbeck’s erosion of profitability and cost overruns on projects was the under
utilization of the firm’s human resource function in project pre-planning, project
tendering and project management. It was on this basis that the human resource
function was promoted to a full business partner at corporate level.
The EPPC industry is a collection of about 100 firms worldwide whose primary
business function is to design, construct, procure and test investment projects
for process producers. Process producers operate in a variety of sectors; oil
and gas (oil and gas refineries), chemical production, for example, eythelene or
plastics, steel production (steel works), and the construction of gas, oil or coal
powered electricity-generating stations. In addition contractors work on unique
engineering projects, for example, bridge construction, the Channel tunnel or
extensions to underground railway systems. Lastly, some EPPC firms work on
nuclear power stations.
Project managers design projects, select project constructors, procure the neces-
sary technologies and arrange and manage project finance. Project managers sell
their technical expertise and person hours to the client; they oversee construction
and process testing and manage, monitor and oversee the entire project. In 1992
Exbeck employed 21 000 administrative, clerical and technical staff and 10 000
craft workers including engineers, project managers, specialist process engineers,
chemists and physicists. The value of work performed in 1991 was $7.5 billion2.
The majority of the firms in the industry are multinationals and work on projects is
undertaken worldwide. Capital projects, oil refineries or chemical plants, are initiated
by producer firms through a process of project tenders. Process producers prefer to
offer tenders for “lump sum turnkey” contracts. These are where the price is speci-
fied for hardware, process technology and labour. The price may be “fixed” or alter-
natively it may be subject to variation by an agreed formula for changes in the rate for
materials or labour. Many projects are of such size that project management firms
organize consortia bids or initiate particular joint ventures (see Clark & Ball, 1991).
The average cost of an Exbeck project is $85 million; however, some super
projects can reach the order of $300 million. In capacity terms steam generators
for nuclear power stations can weigh up to 460 tons whereas aluminium smelters
can have a compression capacity of 200 000 tons per year. Equally, technological
complexity leaves no room for error; for example, flow or process technologies such
as oil refineries will only work if the combinations of chemicals and raw materials
flow in the specified mixes.
Contemporary market conditions have tightened in the industry for three reasons.
First, the market price of oil has fallen considerably† . In consequence there is less
oil refinery business and in addition on current projects the mark-up for project
managers’ profits has been severely tightened. In the early 1980s the mark-up was
in the region of 20% whereas in 1995 it stood at around 10% . Second, industrial
recession in Western Europe has reduced new orders for chemicals and steel
plants. Recession led to the reduction of existing capacity and similar reductions
† Whilst the price of oil remains volatile its price in late 2000 is much higher than when the original work
was undertaken.
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in mark-up capacities for project managers. Third, environmental disasters such as
those at Harrisburg, Chernobyl and Bophal and the Challenger disaster have each
sharpened contractor awareness of potential legal liability and public concern in
general. Contractual liability and public concern over previous experiences have
a significant effect on future business; hence contractors must remain vigilant
over health and safety because one serious environmental or safety failure can
be terminal. For example, two project managers told me that the firm which
manufactured the rubber seals on the Challenger shuttle and one of the main
contractors who employed them were both effectively “out of business” as a result. It
appears that as the market tightens in cost and contractual terms contractors bear
more costs as projects are now routinely tested and inspected beyond statutory
requirements in order to ensure that “we are clean” on particular projects3.
Prior to 1992 Exbeck’s business strategy revolved around an internal power
balance that saw engineers and project management “kingpins” as the central
actors. As Exbeck approached the contemporary period the central role of
kingpins became problematic. Project managers operated as “Lone Rangers”
in a management by objective structure for independent project management.
In 1991 the executive board decided that the situation was not sustainable. In
order to secure improved corporate control over project management kingpins the
structure of independent management by objectives was jettisoned in order to de-
personalize and routinize the status and operational structures that surrounded
project managers4.
Competitive strategy, the corporate human resource function, cost control and financial
performance
As a response to the crisis of profitability an internal business review reported
during a two-day review conference at Exbeck’s US corporate headquarters.
The report established that the decline in project management work and project
management mark-ups were not temporary crises as in the 1972–1974 and 1979–
1981 recessions. Secondly, greater strategic control over tender bidding was
necessary because whilst projects were becoming fewer they were getting much
larger. In this context “Lone Ranger” approaches to project management were
unsustainable, they indulged the idiosyncrasies of “kingpin” project managers but
gave the corporate centre little direct operational control over major projects.
Thirdly, the labour intensive nature of EPPC rendered downsizing the engineering
and project management headcount in an effort to reduce labour costs impractical
other than on the margin. Senior managers were unable to cheapen labour by
directly confronting the labour costs of project management staff. As an alternative
they charged the human resource function with developing and introducing a
series of initiatives with the explicit aim “of whittling away individual and localized
methods of project management associated with particular project specialists”5.
The PTF system and “full business partnership” for the corporate human resource
function aimed not to fragment the work of project managers but intensify their
role by introducing a centrally regulated specification to which project management
specialists would have to adhere.
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In their subsequent announcement of (what was) a centralized cost containment
strategy for project management—the PTF system—was presented as an inte-
grative commitment maximizing system6. More significantly senior executives at
Exbeck were of the view that resistance would subside, as the control strategy re-
duced the problem (wayward project management and cost overruns) it was de-
signed to solve. A functional and rational belief in centralized strategic choice as
a management control strategy for key employees. At no time during the formula-
tion of this strategy did any executive consider the possibility of sustained employee
resistance or frustration.
There are three levels of strategic decision making in large firms. First order
control strategies centre on the long-term direction of the firm and the scope
of its activities. In Exbeck’s case the long-term direction of the firm centred on
sustaining its position in the market as a preferred management contractor. This
necessitated the formulation of a standardized system for project management
that could operate unimpeded by “independent” and “unilateral” styles of project
management over which the corporate centre felt it had insufficient control7. Second
order decisions and control strategies centre on internal operating procedures and
the relationship between different parts of the firm. Prior to the business review
engineer kingpins managed internal operating procedures within Exbeck with the
human resource function operating behind line management in a service only
capacity—“the back room office”8. The promotion of the corporate human resource
function to the status of full business partnership was conceived as a mechanism
to improve internal operating procedures. Third order priorities involve the level
of strategic choice in functional areas of management such as human resources
where initiatives may be centralized or de-centralized to line management. In
general, in large firms, functional areas operate “downstream” from the first and
second order levels of decision-making, both of which have an upward influence
on control strategies. Hence, the human resource function tends to respond to
higher levels of strategy in terms of managing policy outcomes that result from
decisions on the long-term direction of the firm and its internal operating procedures
(see, Purcell & Alhstrand, 1994:44 for a full discussion of these issues). At
Exbeck the peripheral role of HR was manifest in its “go for”9 relationship to the
unilateral demands of project managers and its mundane personnel and employee
relations systems for administrative and clerical staff in the corporate HQ and
divisional offices.
In positioning the corporate human resource function as a second order priority
corporate management sought to improve their control of internal operating
procedures and routinize managerial and operational relations between project
management and functional management. As a response to external competitive
pressures this development had significant resource and financial implications for
Exbeck’s system of project management.
At corporate level the human resources function was excluded from project
management and pre-project forecasting alternatively, it was charged with providing
the resources and presenting a bill to project managers for any essential training
or specific recruitment. In essence, Exbeck wanted to harness its corporate human
resource function more effectively in order to increase corporate control over more
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Figure 1. Exbeck-structure and competitive strategy executive board.
routinized project management to maintain its competitive profile within a tighter
competitive environment. The specific details of the business and human resource
strategies are now outlined.
Internal restructuring: the emergence of executive sponsors and “Project Task Force”
groups
To address tighter competitive and market conditions Exbeck introduced two
innovations at corporate level. First, four cornerstones to competitive strategy
were identified; secondly, Exbeck streamlined its divisional control structure into
five coherent divisions. An “Executive Sponsor”, who is a member of the Exbeck
executive board now controls each division. See Figure 1.
In order for corporate management, in particular the human resource function,
to increase control over internal operating procedures in project management a
system of “Project Task Forces” (PTF) was designed. A project task force brings
a senior member of each division into the strategic planning stage of any particular
tender. Under the PTF system the construction and contracts project manager
prepares a briefing document on the technical and process requirement of a project
and provides a forecasting plan for human resource needs over the length of the
project. PTF members from the other four divisions then formulate their own costed
plans for contracts, human resources, process licenses etc. These are then fed
back to the project manager in order for the bid to be accurately costed. If the
tender is subsequently won the PTF becomes “live”, with each division organizing
the secondment of the necessary staff. The human resource function identifies
staff training and development needs and works with the project manager to
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Figure 2. Project task force profile: oil refinery bid “Iceland”.
ensure accurate human resource scheduling to preclude cost overruns. The internal
operation of PTFs is clearly designed to routinize the labour process of project
management. More significantly, the PTF system challenged the internal hierarchy
of staff at Exbeck, in particular the autonomy of project management staff many of
whom had developed their own methods of control and decision making over project
operations either at the planning and tender stage or on site. These methods are
captured by the terms “kingpins” who operate as “Lone Rangers”, most of whom
had particularized views on managing their workload, the pace at which projects
should move, human resourcing and equity in pay levels and terms and conditions
of secondment to projects. Executive sponsors who control divisional operations
sought to pacify these concerns by stressing that the new system gave the firm
more accurate costings for labour requirements at the pre-project stage, this was
presented as a major benefit in that inaccurate internal costings and subsequent
cost overruns could easily be identified10. Figure 2 illustrates how a PTF operates.
Exbeck’s internal business review identified a key problem in the crisis of
profitability and cash flow—a lack of corporate control over the project management
labour process, in particular the manner in which project management staff
requested and deployed human resources. Executive sponsors sought to arrest the
problems of poor corporate control and budget overrun by presenting a solution
based in strategic HRM. As a control strategy this was designed to reverse the
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peripheral role currently occupied by human resources. The corporate function
designed and implemented the system of project task force groups for project
management over which they have executive control, for example, labour requests
from line managers in respect of labour scheduling, training and development,
recruitment authorization and budgetary authority for line labour costs. However,
the authorization process reflected internal audit standards formulated by the
accounts function11. The position of the corporate human resource function as
a PTF “producer” was strategized as a functional response to de-personalize
particularized autonomies held by some project managers. However, in the main
project managers understood the PTF system as a centralizing control device that
aimed to routinize project management at design and tendering stages12. The
PTF strategy had the aim (over time) of eradicating the operational deployment
of idiosyncratic approaches to “craft” work ∼ project management. Hence new
initiatives for increased corporate control over project management (PTFs, Full
Business Partnership for Corporate HR’s) represent mechanisms that aim to
intensify the labour process of project management staff not necessarily through
task fragmentation but through a tighter specification for labour in the process
of project management. A reliance on “dummy project” simulations convinced
corporate strategists that PTFs would solve the problem was such that inadequate
consideration was given to the possibility of resistance by project management staff.
It appeared that during dummy tender training sessions project managers went
along with the idea whilst having no confidence in it and considerable hostility to
its effects on their self defined “kingpin” status13. As the following section illustrates
when the new system for project management became operational there was
considerable resistance from engineering and process technology staff who, whilst
accepting the inclusion of human resources did not consider them “up to the job” of
live operations14.
Human resource strategy—the human resource function in full business partnership as
corporate monitor
The corporate human resource function assumed control of the management
development programme and monitoring corporate and divisional level financial
performance in the PTF framework for management practice. The executive sponsor
of human resources presented the quality assurance aspects of the restructuring
programme as a four-part exercise that empowered and promoted neglected
employees in a “key” neglected function15. First, positioning human resource staff
and services as central actors and mechanisms within PTFs in order to identify and
cost the human resource needs of a project at an early pre-planning stage. That is,
installing and supervising a control system that routinizes the work of autonomous
but professional colleagues (see Armstrong, 1987:32). Secondly, demonstrating
the benefits of the human resource “audit” strategy to line managers in PTFs.
The corporate human resource function and its PTF unit presented (what was)
the delegation of routine human resource service requests to line managers as
a politically neutral device designed to reduce uncertainty over the cost and
scheduling of labour. Both problems were presented as the result of what they
termed “informal” or “collegiate” project management. The choice of words was
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carefully strategized by senior executives in the HR function with “autonomous”,
“independent” and “personalized” avoided in an attempt to pre-empt hostility and
resistance to the centralization of diversified styles in project management16. The
third aspect involved demonstrating to corporate human resource staff that their
presence within PTFs was valued and taken seriously. Here the control mechanism
(PTFs) was designed to reduce operational uncertainty and gain centralized
financial control over productive capacity. It was presented as their empowerment,
an innovation that would be welcomed by project managers. The final aspect
involved clerical and administration support staff throughout the organization. The
aim was to incorporate these staff into the centralized and routinized system of
project management to demonstrate that non-engineering staff were valued in the
same way as technical and engineering staff. In interviews the head of human
resources, its executive sponsor and the company president, argued that Exbeck
could not confine its development programme to corporate level management and
needed to involve administrative and clerical staff in the PTF system.
The monitoring devices were established to “persuade” engineers and project
leaders to take the human resource function seriously. However, it was made clear
to the head of human resources that their job was not to exercise “fanciful” control.
Rather, human resources at corporate level were briefed to use their position to
improve information and communication flows between themselves and project
groups in order that the PTF system could operate effectively and to budget. To
substantiate the control profile of human resources as a full business partner
the executive sponsor and the head of human resources fleshed out the human
resources agent for change programme, which is summarized in Figure 3.
The training and development programme is central to the control and routiniza-
tion strategy and is targeted on two levels. First, line managers in PTFs, including
the human resources PTF unit represented the primary targets. The thrust of PTF
training and development relates to Figure 2 where the PTF system is sketched
out. After attending 4 day schools beyond their specialist area PTF members were
asked to work on a dummy bid, “Iceland Refinery”. The second target group for the
training and development programme is administrative and clerical staff. In an effort
to head off the possibility of effective resistance by these staff Exbeck initiated the
system of employee focus groups. The system was presented as demonstrative of
Exbeck’s desire to empower administrative and clerical staff in PTFs17.
Focus groups operate across divisions with the result that administrative and
clerical staffs working on a particular PTF have an opportunity to liaise with staff in
other divisions. Equally, focus groups meet periodically to discuss project progress
and share problems they experience with PTF staff. Because PTF groups have a
defined roll of members, focus group staffs are able to identify particular staff they
need to speak with. After each focus group meeting a report is produced and picked
up by the relevant task force with any defective or incomplete requisitions sent back
to the originator in the PTF. Equally, employee focus groups report to corporate
human resources on matters such as the manner in which a PTF conducts internal
business, for example how its paperwork facilitates accurate financial data.
Support staff are now encouraged to act independently in sourcing service
requests. For example, if a requisition is marked urgent but not correctly specified,
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Figure 3. HR’s agent for internal change.
costed or clearly signed off support staff are encouraged to use their experience
and discretion. If such action is deemed incorrect by the PTF, but undertaken in
the absence of essential information, the PTF has the cost of worked support time
added to their budget and bid costs.
What was a direct Tayloristic attack on the professional autonomy of project
managers by Executive Sponsors was modelled in the discourse of strategic human
resource management in a highly instrumental manner, apparently in the belief that
a sophisticated use of language would deflect, deter and neutralize any resistance.
The “deployment of strategic choice”, at executive level, ignored deeply embedded
patterns of independent and particularized project management. Further, as Smith
(1991) demonstrates, the particular circumstances of an industrial sector pre-
condition the perspective of engineers to job design and its reform. In EPPC the
comparatively sheltered competitive conditions that operated prior to the late 1980s
legitimized independence and promoted the “kingpins” and their “Lone Ranger”
approaches to project management.
The emergence of resistance by project managers
Project management staff appeared to accept the presence and profile of human
resource staff in PTFs and further accepted their monitoring and audit roles.
However, gradually project management staff began to fall back on their customary
and individually regulated codes of behaviour in an effort to retain exclusive control
over project management.
After a successful pilot the PTF became a standard operating procedure and
appeared to result in sustained improvement in financial performance—an average
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of 2% on the tender bid (see Clark, 1999). However, a closer inspection of projects
over the longer period revealed that engineering staff began to indulge human
resource staff by appealing to their “superior functionalism” in costing, forecasting,
scheduling and managing human resources in PTFs. Instead of doing much of
the work themselves, as directed by the PTF system for project management,
project staff began to demonstrate their willingness to accept the monitoring role
of human resource staff by reversing the process of delegation back to them. This
phenomenon was observed in at least six projects18.
Whilst human resource practitioners are able to assert and to some degree
demonstrate that they possess the prescriptive skills to inspire such integration
they are far less clear minded on how the possession of skills leads to actual
control of embedded processes such as, in this case, project management. The
difficulty appears to centre around a critical difference between designing a process
of integration and integrating a concern for employee resourcing and development
into the role of professionals who do not want these matters de-centralized to line
managers. That is, the theme of much in the HR literature—that professes to assert
that line managers want more executive control of human resource issues—appears
open to question. Equally, this is something different from asserting that strategic
HRM can improve the bottom line because the bottom line is concerned with
financial performance and productivity not necessarily the development of human
resources as individuals.
Project managers appeared capable of cajoling members of the corporate human
resource function to service and cost their own monitoring audits on the strength
of the fact that they were now “part of the (project task) force”. It became apparent
during the fieldwork that human resource staff appeared unable to grasp this point
when it was put to them during interviews. The following was typical of the response
to this point.
Look they are in broad terms doing what we want them to do—the fact they we are helping
them shows they value our role19.
Individually project management staff began to effectively resist the routinization
of their labour process by side stepping the discipline of human resource auditing
and scheduling. This involved getting human resource staff to do the work because
“they were the experts”.
The “neutral” control strategy which centralized HRM failed to anticipate the
possibility that project management staff might exhibit resistance informed by a
perception that corporate executives were encroaching on accepted, if disparate
norms in a particularized labour process. Project management staff were primarily
interested in retaining their autonomy in acquired and respected “Lone Ranger”
skills, which they argued they used creatively not recklessly. Project managers
defended this position by recognizing the importance of accurate requisitions for
labour costs by passing the relevant information to human resource staff (to enable
them to do the job) much earlier than they did before the introduction of the PTF
system.
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2. The Financial Basis of Strategic Action in HRM
The influence of the accounts function and management accounting in particular is
pivotal in American and British firms. The extent of this influence is so great that
the mechanics of accountancy especially the audit mechanism has the potential to
displace any independent contribution made by human resource specialists (see
Armstrong, 1989, 1995; Purcell & Alhstrand, 1994).
In this case financial criteria appear to predominate over more developmental,
apparently ephemeral innovations designed to add value through training and
development. The bottom line financial criteria of the balance sheet are incompatible
with the needs of individual employees. At Exbeck the plurality of methods in project
management generated the lone ranger project manager—the standardization of
PTFs and the emergence of the corporate human resource function as an audit
mechanism exposed this diversity of management styles.
This is not to deny that aspects of Exbeck’s human resource strategy were
not developmental yet it appears that individual innovations were instrumentally
structured by financial criteria that formed the modus operandi of the corporate
function. The latter became less peripheralized by assuming a role which has been
described as a conformist innovator, (see Legge, 1978), providing “Hard Data” for
executive sponsors to evaluate the operational performance of PTFs against project
pre-planning and tender formulation.
A project task force works to a pre-determined audited budget that has the effect
of turning project management specialists into line management budget holders.
The experience of the corporate human resource function at Exbeck is illustrative
of an emergent phenomena where discrete initiatives are bundled together as a
high performance system and presented as an instrument through which financial
performance targets are secured.
High performance human resource systems or bundles exhibit careful recruit-
ment and selection strategies, substantial communication mechanisms (such as
employee focus groups) and flexible team working in customized groups (PTFs).
Equally, a bundle or system may contain a significant emphasis on training and
development, empowerment and performance appraisal linked to pay. Recent
contributions to the literature suggest a positive association between financial
performance—the bottom line—and business strategies which emphasizes such
systems. Arthur (1994) demonstrates that turnover and productivity are positively
affected by cost reduction strategies—what he terms control strategies or those
based on improving employee commitment, what he terms commitment systems.
Arthur suggests that a firm can have a competitive strategy based in cost
reduction or quality and that in terms of financial outcomes a parallel (strategic
choice) of human resource strategy will yield positive results. Huselid (1995)
found that high performance work practices, those that include human resource
strategies that are internally integrated but also integrated with business strategy,
have a significant impact on a firm’s financial performance. Osterman (1995, 1999)
concluding on a large survey of manufacturing establishments suggests that if a
firm operates within an internationalised high technology market which requires
high skill levels (as Exbeck does) it is not possible for them to buck market
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conditions. Hence, industry profile and competitive structure are influential factors
that pre-figure the deployment of high performance or innovative work practices.
This bundling effect is also reported by Dyer and Reeves (1995) who suggest that
bundles or configurations of human resource strategies are more likely to have a
cumulative impact on financial performance than individual measures which may be
effective if ephemeral. That is measures which appear to have a qualitative impact
on the work environment that cannot be captured quantitatively, for example a “good
work atmosphere”, it is clear when it is present and is often taken for granted.
However, its disappearance may have relatively immediate effects both qualitatively
and quantitatively.
The survey material cited whilst informative shares a common concern with
a narrow range of financial outcomes. These are measured through reduced
absenteeism and turnover resulting in improved productivity, the latter often
expressed as tighter adherence to budgets, return on investment or secured mark-
up. Moreover, survey material may lack discussion of the wider job regulation
effects of human resource strategies that impact on the discretion and autonomy
of employees or detail the origins of high performance bundles.
The wider literature on the most recent manifestation of strategic HRM—
“integrated bundles” sometimes termed high performance work systems demon-
strates the prominence of audit and budgetary interests in financial control
mechanisms that link HRM to business strategy. Huselid (1995:667) and Dyer and
Reeves (1995:668) concede these points and suggest that although linkage is
more than plausible some of the effects are indeterminate. That is, links between
strategic HRM and financial performance may not derive from the cumulative effect
of individual human resource strategies which improve financial performance but
the audit and budgetary discipline which underpins each and runs through them
all. The PTF system at Exbeck appears to demonstrate this, particularly its audit
tracing mechanism. Audit tracing involves checking original tender bids against
work off costs and project profits and apportioning responsibility for incurring extra
costs. This aim of this component in the strategy was to place project managers in
a reporting relationship to the corporate human resource and accounts function.
3. Financially Inspired HRM and Labour Process De-Skilling
Braverman’s (1974) book Labour and Monopoly Capital stirred interest in the capi-
talist labour process. Essentially, Braverman’s thesis suggests that all management
action aim to de-skill the production process at the point of production in order for
management to better control authority relations therein. De-skilling has the effect
of either removing or lowering the skill level required from those performing the job,
in some cases this will also reduce the price of labour. However, for corporate man-
agers at Exbeck this was not a priority whereas improved corporate control over
lone ranger styles of management via a standardized PTF was a significant priority.
Braverman’s notion of de-skilling appears primarily concerned with the simplifica-
tion of craft work through greater management control and planning of the labour
process with the aim of reducing labour costs. However, the thesis can be applied to
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managerial professionals in the form of deprofessionalization or depowerment—in
contrast to the empowerment of the HR function in this case. Hence, in the case of
project managers it was the reporting systems and loss of autonomy that appeared
to de-skill their job. Thus, project managers may not have been de-skilled in the
traditional sense but the effects of perceived and to some degree operational de-
professionalization had much the same effects if only in a procedural rather than a
substantive sense20.
Debates in the labour process literature focus on the centrality of control strategies
to management action and the frustration of such strategies by employees. The
debate positions two camps, one which in general terms can be described as
unreconstructed exhibiting a general acceptance of the Braverman de-skilling thesis
whilst offering empirically observable theoretical developments. Advocates of this
approach include Friedman (1977), Burawoy (1979), Edwards (1979), Armstrong
(1988, 1989) and Thompson (1989). Other extreme critics consider Braverman’s
approach over rational and conceptually and empirically flawed (Knights & Wilmott,
1986, 1990). In contrast, other critics emphasize the poorly regulated and slow take-
up of scientific management (Littler, 1982), whereas others highlight the failure of
Braverman to consider the likelihood of effective resistance by employees (Wood,
1982). For the purpose of this paper it is possible to distill this debate into a distinct
criticism of the de-skilling thesis that addresses the theoretically informed research
questions raised by this case study.
The de-skilling thesis is catch all and reductionist emphasizing successful management
rationality
At Exbeck the corporate human resource function appears integrated within
corporate strategy—human resource specialists together with accountants devised
the PTF system which in its prescription aimed to erode the autonomy of project
managers by introducing centralized performance measures. Standardized PTFs
dissociate aspects of the project management labour process with the effect
of reducing lone ranger autonomy and discretion. Further, PTFs give executive
sponsors and the human resource function financial control of projects, breaking
the kingpin status of project managers who now report to them.
However, operationally executive sponsors and the corporate human resource
function tolerate deviation from the book standard of PTF procedures precisely
because of the bottom line contribution they provide. Sponsors and senior human
resource managers were not particularly bothered about how the audit aspects of a
PTF improved the bottom line. They explicitly stated this when the point was put to
them in interviews.
It doesn’t really matter how it gets done as long as it delivers—that’s the point.
That may be the case now but over time I believe it will work to book procedures21.
More significantly than this acceptance of deviation from book procedures, the
financially inspired deployment of strategic HRM disturbed an embedded pattern of
traditional HRM that is highly characteristic of non-union firms such as Exbeck. Tra-
ditional HRM defines employees as the basis of a firms competitive advantage—its
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most valued assets with non-union employers characterized as sophisticated pater-
nalists where the aim of HRM is to position employer commitment to employees as
a substitution strategy for union membership thereby marginalising any propensity
to unionize. The human relations origins of this approach highlight meeting em-
ployee needs through group work supported by managerial attention and praise.
Equally, under traditional HRM the human resource function exhibits significant
strategic integration between human resource policies, for example appraisal and
employee ranking reviews linked to merit and performance related pay, single status
employment and a strong developmental approach to employee recruitment and
retention. (For summary reviews of traditional HRM see Foulkes, 1980; Keenoy,
1990 and Applebaum & Batt, 1994.) In contrast to the aims of strategic HRM
the components of traditional HRM tend to be isolated from business strategy. At
Exbeck one result of this isolation was the emergence of Lone Ranger styles of
project management and a form of craft respect for the kingpin status of project
managers which strategic HRM, at least in design, would de-skill and undermine.
However, although tangential to the theoretical questions addressed in this paper
the responsible autonomy thesis as detailed by Friedman (1977) does not neces-
sarily advocate the acceptance of diverse idiosyncratic versions of craft—project
management—control described in the term Lone Rangers. Rather, Lone Ranger
systems appear to represent embedded systems of project management that frus-
trate direct control mechanisms which management periodically attempt to develop
by the introduction of technical and bureaucratic methods (see Edwards, 1979)22.
The evidence in Section 1 demonstrates that executive sponsors and senior
human resource managers clung to the rationality of PTFs whilst consciously
ignoring the resistance and reverse delegation pursued by project managers. To
retain a veneer of management capability and rationality both actions were tolerated
because over the cycle of PTF projects financial performance did improve. Hence
the key issue for senior human resource managers and executive sponsors was
generating consent to the innovation which, even though it was perfunctory and
devious rather than consummate, limited the direct control of de-skilling that a move
to strategic HRM would suggest.
Conclusions
Senior members of the corporate human resource function and task force executive
sponsors presented PTFs as a high performance—high commitment bundle of
human resource initiatives designed to sustain Exbeck’s competitive position by
transmitting an integrative approach to project management culminating in full
business partnership for the corporate function. Further, this was presented as a
sector specific example that bucks the well-established trend to a peripheralized
human resource function. However, the empirically informed theoretical argument
that the research questions of this study address lead to several alternative
conclusions. First, the narrowly conceived audit and budgetary basis of the PTF
system actually reinforced the peripheral role of the human resource function whilst
simultaneously challenging the scope of any independent action exercised under
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the label of traditional HRM. This became evident both formally and informally—
formally through the intervention of the accounts function—informally through
resistance strategies successfully deployed by project managers. PTFs, whatever
the human resource rhetoric are cost centres which report to the business units—
Exbeck’s five operating divisions—creating a further dissemination and integration
of financial issues into business objectives not an integration of traditional or even
normatively defined strategic HRM into business objectives. The latter merely
transmitted the financial imperative to further gentrify and legitimize the financial
control and co-ordination measures inherent to the accountancy function as human
resource goals, performance standards and strategies. Equally, the movement to
strategic HRM and the performance of the corporate human resource function
became self defining in the presence of hard data with the normative goals of cost
reduction and associated policies defined beyond the human resource profession.
Second, and related although it is vogue to present measures of “fit” in strategic
HRM in terms of contribution to the bottom line “fit” defines strategic HRM and is
not defined by a theory of strategic HRM. At Exbeck a particularized cost reduction
strategy was conceived by the accounts function and developed on its behalf by the
corporate human resource function. The latter gentrified internal audit mechanisms
and a more rigid adherence to pre-set budgets as strategic HRM, a financially
inspired alternative to more legitimate direct control methods that generate a more
open and contested frontier of control.
Lastly, the dominance of financial control in American and British firms is the
wider operational and strategic context of human resource management. The
rhetoric and prescription of HRM appear unable to recognize the importance of a
specific financial link between practice and performance. The grounding of Exbeck’s
approach to HRM in traditional methods rather than strategic methods make it more
genuine than most, yet the pressures culminating in the movement to the latter
were competitive and financial not developmental. However, the empirical weakness
of traditional HRM, often referred to in the UK as soft HRM, has not led to its
prescriptive downfall. The ephemeral nature of initiatives that periodically come
to constitute the latest manifestation of strategic HRM such as high performance
bundles or work systems questions the causal relationship between human
resource initiatives that pass in and out of vogue and financial performance in
host firms. As HRM becomes more strategic it increasingly sheds developmental
aspects and gentrifies financial aspects—the bottom-line which necessarily de-
skill human resource professionals more effectively than the workgroups subject
to the strategy. As HRM develops initiatives come and go whereas the centrality of
financial mechanisms increase and become more sophisticated.
Notes
1. EPPC is a highly competitive industry. The bidding process is particularly sensitive, as a result it
has not been possible to use the real name of the firm. The contacts for this study were established
as a result of work on the ESRC programme “The Competitiveness of British Industry” (contract
number WF20250031), subsequent work and the costs of overseas travel were funded by a grant
from Leicester Business School Research Committee.
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2. Because all projects are dollar priced by Exbeck dollar values have been used here. Moreover, most
process commodities e.g. oil are internationally priced and traded in dollars.
3. Interview transcription notes with project manager on site.
4. Interview transcription notes with executive sponsor and head of human resources—this was
explicitly stated.
5. Interview transcription notes—reaction to findings from internal business review.
6. Interview transcription notes of the view of the Executive Sponsor of HR and the Corporate head of
HR’s.
7. Interview transcription notes—as above it was their view. In the body of the paper “lone ranger”
summarizes these approaches.
8. Interview transcription notes with project managers—this view was elaborated on several occasions.
9. Interview transcription notes with Head of HR. Pronounced “go 4”—go for this go for that!
10. Interview transcription notes with Executive Sponsor of Hr’s and the collective view of Executive
Sponsor’s at the internal business review. At no time during the processes that led to the creation of
the PTF system was there any consideration of what was being attempted beyond the management
rhetoric of HRM i.e. the system was instrumental in improving economic performance nothing else.
11. Exbeck “Human Resources for Change Agent Program” manual.
12. Interview transcription notes with project managers in the office and on site. Responses to employee
attitude survey.
13. This conclusion was formulated after listening to the responses of several project managers:-
“Its typical he’s (points to photo of company founding father and son) interested in this so we are
doing it. I doubt that it will make much difference once we get into tender operations on site”.
“They used to organize fire drills and provide us with visa’s now they think they can tell us what
to do, their job is to sort out compensation and benefits my job it to make things work—I’m no good
with paperwork and they’re no good with a board diagram—but we can pretend”.
14. Interview Transcription notes with project managers on site.
15. Interview Transcription notes with Executive Sponsor of human resources—this was his view.
16. Executive Sponsor strategy meeting on naming what became the PTF system.
17. Exbeck Human Resource Change Agent Program—manual.
18. Whilst shadowing several project managers it became clear to me that what I have described as
the process of reverse delegation went unchallenged and even unnoticed by human resource staff
attached to particular projects. On questioning them about this I was left with the impression that
this is how the system is supposed to work and although HR staff were doing much of the work
they wanted project managers to do their presence sustained the importance of accurate employee
resourcing and development schedules. That is, they were able to monitor projects and keep project
management staff in line! Interview notes with HR PTF staff.
19. Interview transcription notes with HR staff in PTF’s.
20. I am grateful to a referee for pointing out this subtle if significant difference.
21. Interview notes with Corporate staff in Human resources.
22. Again I am indebted to the referee for their encouraging comments that enabled me distinguish these
often conflated tendencies.
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